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MODERNIZING UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN 
MISSOURI: REMOVING THE INSURANCE PARADOX BETWEEN 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED COVERAGE VIA 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
After leaving work late, Peter Gibbons, who recently purchased his 
daughter a used car, the older model version of his wife’s, finds himself on a 
narrow two-lane road. Looking ahead, he sees two headlights approaching 
rapidly and takes notice as they dip from his lane to the oncoming traffic lane. 
Reacting quickly, Peter veers to the side, but is struck by the oncoming vehicle 
in a moment that seems to last forever. He becomes disorientated, overcome by 
the confusion, pain, and knowledge that he is seriously injured as his now 
mangled car comes to a halt in a shallow ditch on the side of the road. In this 
moment he knows not to whom the dancing headlights belonged, nor does he 
care. In this moment he thinks only of his family and of contacting them. 
After an extended hospital stay and the prospect of extensive physical 
rehabilitation, Peter attempts to move forward from this life-altering event and 
contacts his automobile insurance carrier. During this call, the insurer records a 
statement of the events and asks Peter for a copy of the police report. He 
observes that the police report lists the name of the other driver, described as 
“Driver 2,” along with other pertinent details, such as the make and model of 
the vehicles involved. It is only now that Peter begins to realize the importance 
of Driver 2, and his stomach begins to turn with fear as he scans across to a 
box marked “Insurance.” 
In Missouri, drastic differences exist concerning the recovery available to 
an innocent party involved in an accident depending on the insurance status of 
the tortfeasor. Some of the most important aspects of these differences depend 
upon the innocent party’s automobile insurance policy, as opposed to the 
policy of the tortfeasor.1 These differences can severely impact the available 
recovery of an innocent party based solely upon whether the tortfeasor 
maintained state-required automobile insurance.2 Although an intuitive thinker 
 
 1. Compare Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en 
banc), with Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc) (illustrating the differences a tortfeasor’s insurance status (uninsured versus underinsured, 
respectively) makes concerning the recovery under the innocent party’s insurance policy). 
 2. Compare Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544–45, with Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383–84. 
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may conclude that an individual would be better compensated financially in 
instances where the negligent party to an accident maintains auto insurance as 
required under Missouri state law, that same intuitive thinker may need to read 
on. As a result of statutory interpretation and Missouri public policy, an 
innocent party obtains greater insurance benefits when the tortfeasor does not 
maintain insurance versus when the tortfeasor maintains state-minimum 
insurance.3 
Currently, Missouri law is in a state of flux concerning instances where the 
tortfeasor maintains insurance but damages to the innocent party are greater 
than the tortfeasor’s liability coverage.4 This uncertainty negatively impacts 
both insurers and consumers by creating unpredictable judicial results and 
unfairly limiting recovery for insureds.5 To rectify this dilemma, the Missouri 
legislature ought to reformulate the insurance regulations concerning a type of 
coverage known as underinsured motorist coverage in order to increase 
predictability for insurers and provide adequate protection for consumers. 
Protection from the mistakes of others is an essential aspect of insurance 
created by spreading the risks, and subsequent losses, to an aggregate group, 
thereby lessening the impact on any one individual.6 An essential legal aspect 
of insurance coverage is the idea that the purchase of insurance is a contract 
between an insurer and a consumer, subject to the constraints of the law.7 
These contracts, entered into between insurers and insureds, provide economic 
relief when an unforeseen circumstance occurs.8 By spreading the risk over a 
large population, the individual benefits by paying an affordable premium that 
provides economic protections.9 Insurance companies are able to make a profit 
by properly forecasting the aggregate cost and charging a premium across that 
aggregate which is greater than that loss.10 In order to accurately forecast that 
loss, insurance companies require certainty regarding minimum insurance 
requirements.11 
 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. Michael Ward, Limitations on UIM Coverage Go the Way of the Dinosaurs, THE FIRM 
INQUIRY, Spring 2010, at 1, 8, 11, available at http://www.brownjames.com/mm/files/2010_ 
Spring_Firm_Inquiry.pdf (a publication from the law firm Brown & James in St. Louis, 
Missouri). 
 5. Id. at 11. 
 6. See DAVID BUCKHAM, JASON WAHL & STUART ROSE, EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO 
SOLVENCY II 1–2 (2011). 
 7. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the 
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 472, 523 (1961). 
 8. See BUCKHAM, supra note 6, at 6–9 (discussing the origins of insurance as well as the 
need for risk mitigation in the financial advancement of modern societies). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 11–13. 
 11. Id. at 12–13 (“For both insurer and insured to benefit from the contract, an insurable risk 
must be identified . . . as opposed to the uncertainty of an unquantifiable adverse event.”). 
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Insureds, the other weight to this balance, require sufficient and affordable 
coverage to protect against catastrophic loss.12 As the quasi-mediator to this 
balance between insurance certainty and consumer protection, state 
governments create a regulatory scheme aimed to protect the interests of both 
entities.13 These insurance regulatory schemes vary from state to state and are 
comprised of statutes, common law, and public policy.14 
In the state of Missouri, both legislative and judicial devices regulate a 
type of auto insurance known as underinsured motorist coverage.15 Although it 
is one of the newer types of coverage offered by insurance companies, 
underinsured motorist coverage becomes extremely important when an 
innocent party’s damages from an accident exceed the liability insurance 
coverage of the tortfeasor.16 Thus, when a tortfeasor is liable for damages in an 
amount greater than their liability insurance, the injured party may rely on their 
own underinsured motorist coverage to help alleviate the financial burden 
resulting from the torfeaser’s inadequate liability coverage.17 
This Comment will outline the benefits and shortcomings associated with 
underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage in Missouri and propose a legislative 
remedy to foster predictability, uniformity, and greater consumer protection. 
Because of the commonalities and shared history between UIM coverage and 
uninsured motorist coverage (“UM”), this paper must also explain and analyze 
UM coverage. Part I outlines Missouri’s law for contract interpretation, which 
includes interpreting insurance policies; defines both UM and UIM coverage; 
and defines terms important to both types of coverage in order to develop a 
concrete roadmap and the basis of knowledge required to understand and 
analyze the issues presented in this comment. Part II examines the current state 
of both types of coverage in Missouri through an analysis of Missouri court 
decisions and legislative actions. 
Part III takes a step back from the state of Missouri by taking a cursory 
view of the laws and policies affecting UIM coverage in all fifty states. This 
view illustrates the trend throughout the United States of enacting legislation 
affecting UIM coverage. Part IV proposes a solution to alleviate the problems 
Missouri faces with the uncertainty and unpredictability of UIM coverage. This 
solution entails a legislative enactment defining aspects intrinsic to UIM 
 
 12. Robert C. Niesley, Payment Bond Claims Handling and the Law of Bad Faith, in THE 
LAW OF PAYMENT BONDS 358 (Kevin L. Lybeck & H. Bruce Shreves eds., 1998) (stating that the 
two main goals of state regulation are maintaining insurer solvency and promoting the equitable, 
moral, and legal interests of policyholders). 
 13. Id.; Kimball, supra note 7, at 472. 
 14. Niesley, supra note 12, at 358. 
 15. Ward, supra note 4, at 1, 8. 
 16. Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Geneser v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 17. Hopkins, 896 S.W.2d at 935. 
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coverage while simultaneously providing semi-reciprocal treatment between 
UM and UIM coverage, thereby creating certainty for insurers and sufficient 
protections for insureds. The overall gains from an insurer’s ability to predict 
costs of UIM policies, coupled with an individual’s ability to receive similar 
protections under UM and UIM coverage, benefit both the insurance and 
consumer interests of Missouri.18 
I.  DEFINING ASPECTS OF UIM AND UM COVERAGE AND PRESENTING 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION LAW OF MISSOURI 
To create a basic understanding and concrete roadmap for this topic, a 
certain degree of background information is necessary. This background will 
be provided by exploring the application and history of UIM and UM 
coverage, the definition and application of the insurance terms “stacking” and 
“set-off provision,” and the judicial interpretation standards for insurance 
contracts in Missouri. 
A. History of UM and UIM Motorist Coverage 
Missouri requires UM coverage within all automobile insurance policies to 
protect an innocent party when a tortfeasor fails to maintain the state-required 
minimum coverage.19 This either means the tortfeasor does not maintain 
insurance—a violation of Missouri law—or maintains liability insurance from 
a different state where the required minimum limits are less than those required 
in Missouri, provided that there is no provision in the out-of-state insurance 
policy for matching foreign minimum coverage.20 When an innocent party 
sustains damage greater than the protections offered by the tortfeasor—which 
are typically non-existent21—UM coverage, as a part of the injured party’s 
insurance, provides financial support to subsidize the incurred costs.22 
 
 18. Niesley, supra note 12, at 358. 
 19. See MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (2011) (requiring the inclusion of UM coverage within 
all automobile insurance polices issued in the state of Missouri with a minimum protection 
against death or bodily injury of $25,000 as required by MO. REV. STAT. § 303.030(5) (2011)). 
 20. Thomas D. Bixby, Resolving a Peculiar Paradox: Uninsured Motorist Coverage Applied 
to an Underinsured Tortfeasor, 62 MO. L. REV. 591, 591, 606 (1997) (concluding that if an 
individual maintains liability insurance from another state at less than the levels required in 
Missouri then UM coverage, and not UIM coverage, shall be the source of recovery for the 
injured party); see also State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ardrey, 353 S.W.3d 437, 439–40 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
 21. See M. Brian Slaughter, Comment, Khirieh v. State Farm: Have the Floodgates to 
Uninsured Motorist Claims Been Opened?, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 739, 741 (1993). 
 22. Id. (“The purpose of UM coverage is to protect individuals from financially irresponsible 
motorists who neither carry liability insurance nor have the financial resources to compensate 
people whom they injure through the negligent use of a motor vehicle.”) 
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The creation of UM coverage predates the creation of UIM coverage and 
stems from consumer demand in the 1950s for additional protections to avoid 
substantial loss to innocent parties caused by uninsured motorists.23 During this 
time, a boom in consumer ownership of automobiles necessitated greater 
protections.24 Although many insurance companies met the consumer demand 
by voluntarily offering UM coverage within general automobile policies, state 
legislatures nationwide took action.25 
Across the country, legislatures created universal UM coverage by 
statutorily mandating that all automobile insurance policies within their 
respective states contain UM provisions.26 By the 1970s, this push for coverage 
reached every state and mandated the offering, if not inclusion, of UM 
coverage in all automobile polices.27 Missouri enacted its statute requiring 
universal UM coverage for automobile policies issued within the state in 1967 
with the enactment of section 379.203 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.28 The 
initial enactment included the mandate to provide UM coverage for Missouri 
insureds,29 and it has withstood all four of the amendments to section 
379.203.30 
Following the enactment of statutory mandates, a paradox developed 
where an insured could recover more when the tortfeasor was uninsured than 
 
 23. Jeffrey A. Kelso & Matthew R. Drevlow, When Does the Clock Start Ticking? A Primer 
on Statutory and Contractual Time Limitation Issues Involved in Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Claims, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 689, 689–90 (1999); see also Slaughter, supra note 21, at 
741 (“The first UM coverage was offered by New York insurance companies in 1955. In 1957, 
New Hampshire became the first state to require insurance companies to include UM coverage in 
its automobile insurance policies.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 24. Rusty Monhollon, Suburbanites and Suburbia, in BABY BOOM: PEOPLE AND 
PERSPECTIVES 149, 155 (Rusty Monhollon ed., 2010) (stating that from 1950 to 1960, vehicle 
registrations in America increased from 40 million to 74 million). 
 25. Kelso & Drevlow, supra note 23, at 689–90. 
 26. Id. at 690. 
 27. Id. 
 28. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203. 
 29. Dawson v. Denney-Parker, 967 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The Dawson court 
reprinted the original text of section 379.203: 
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this 
state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state 
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for 
bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons 
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators 
of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, 
resulting therefrom . . . . 
Id. 
 30. After its enactment in 1967, the statute was amended in 1971, 1972, 1982, and 1991. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203. 
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when the tortfeasor maintained minimal liability coverage.31 For instance, if an 
insured maintained $50,000 of UM coverage and suffered $50,000 of damages 
from a collision with an uninsured motorist, the insured would receive the 
extent of the UM coverage limits: $50,000.32 However, if the insured suffered 
$50,000 of damages and the tortfeasor maintained state minimum insurance of 
$25,000, that individual would receive only the $25,000 of coverage through 
the tortfeasor’s liability policy.33 UIM insurance developed to counteract that 
paradox.34 That is, UIM insurance developed to provide sufficient protections 
available to an injured party regardless of the insurance status of the tortfeasor, 
including the maintenance of state minimum insurance.35 By the 1990s, more 
than thirty states mandated UIM coverage offerings as a response to this 
paradox—Missouri has not.36 
Analogous to UM coverage, UIM coverage protects an injured party when 
a tortfeasor maintains inadequate liability insurance to cover the full extent of 
damages sustained.37 The two types of coverage diverge at the point of 
application. UIM coverage applies when the liability limits of the tortfeasor 
equal or surpass the required minimum liability limits under Missouri law but 
the damages sustained by the injured party go beyond the amount of liability 
coverage carried by the tortfeasor.38 The fundamental design of UIM coverage 
is to pay “for losses incurred because another negligent motorist’s coverage 
[was] insufficient to pay for the injured person’s actual losses.”39 For example, 
if an insured suffers $50,000 in damages, and the tortfeasor maintains 
$100,000 of liability insurance, the injured party is not underinsured. However, 
if that tortfeasor maintains the required state minimum liability insurance, 
$25,000 in Missouri, then that injured party is underinsured in the amount of 
$25,000. 
UIM coverage further differs from UM coverage in that no statutory 
mandate currently exists that requires the inclusion of UIM protection within 
Missouri automobile insurance policies40—UIM coverage is an optional 
 
 31. Jeffrey E. Thomas, 6 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW Library Edition § 
65.01[1][b] (2011). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); 
Thomas, supra note 31, § 65.01[1][b]. 
 37. Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 38. Stephen R. Bough & M. Blake Heath, Current Issues in Underinsured and Uninsured 
Insurance Coverage in Missouri, 68 J. MO. BAR 208, 210 (2012). 
 39. Hopkins, 896 S.W.2d at 935 (citing Geneser v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 787 
S.W.2d 288, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 40. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 824 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
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coverage separately offered by the insurer and purchased by the consumer.41 
Since UIM coverage is optional, the Missouri law of contracts governs 
coverage disputes.42 No Missouri public policy reaches UIM coverage.43 
B. Stacking and Set-off Provisions 
Insurance policies in Missouri routinely include anti-stacking clauses and 
set-off provisions to better control and limit the payouts to insureds.44 These 
terms often represent the crux of UIM coverage disputes between insureds and 
insurers as the provisions control both the limits and scope of recovery.45 
Missouri allows set-off provisions in both UM and UIM coverage when the 
offset is a recovery from the tortfeasor.46 However, anti-stacking clauses are 
prohibited in Missouri UM coverage, even though they are permitted within 
UIM coverage.47 Although different rights exist depending on the type of 
coverage invoked, the meanings of the terms stacking and set-off remain the 
same.48 
The ability to stack coverages is the process of obtaining benefits from 
additional policies on the same claim when recovery from the first policy alone 
 
 41. Hopkins, 896 S.W.2d at 935. 
 42. Turner, 824 S.W.2d at 21. 
 43. See Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. 1991) 
(en banc); infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 44. DAVID D. NOCE, MISSOURI PRACTICE, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7:35 (2d ed. 
2011) [hereinafter NOCE, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE] (“generally . . . the limits of the liability 
of a liability insurer may be established by contract. Contractual provisions reducing the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage by reason of such [third party] payments have been recognized as 
valid[,]” if they are “not ambiguous.”). These anti-stacking provisions take many forms. The 
following is an anti-stacking provision held to be unambiguous by the Missouri Supreme Court: 
No. 5. Other Automobile Insurance in the Company—With respect to any occurrence, 
accident, death, or loss to which this and any other automobile insurance policy issued to 
the named insured or spouse by the company also applies, the total limit of the 
Company’s liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of 
liability or benefit amount under any one such policy. 
Noll v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 774 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 45. Bough & Heath, supra note 38, at 210 (“The policy language will determine whether 
stacking underinsured coverage is permissible and whether an insurer is entitled to a setoff.”); see 
also Ward, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing the importance for insurers to pay careful attention to 
Missouri court decisions concerning anti-stacking and set-off provisions). 
 46. Tatum v. Van Liner Ins. Co. of Fenton, Mo., 104 F.3d 223, 224–25 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(citing Ragsdale v. Armstrong, 916 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)); Bough & Heath, supra 
note 38, at 212. 
 47. Cameron Mut. Ins. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) 
(prohibiting enforcement of anti-stacking provision within UM coverage); Rodriguez, 808 
S.W.2d at 383–84 (permitting the enforcement of anti-stacking provisions within UIM coverage). 
 48. See NOCE, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 44, at § 7:35 (regarding stacking); 
id. § 7:19 (regarding set-off provisions, also known as offsets). 
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would be inadequate to cover the accrued damages.49 Insureds accomplish this 
by combining the coverage limits of every owned insured vehicle to achieve 
maximum coverage.50 The ability to stack may bridge across insurance 
companies to include similar coverages purchased from several insurers.51 For 
ease of explanation, assume a Missouri individual owns three vehicles with a 
$50,000 UM coverage limit on each. If two coverages are purchased through 
Insurer A, and the third coverage is purchased from Insurer B, that insured can 
stack the intra-policy UM coverage limits from Insurer A, along with stacking 
the inter-policy UM coverage from Insurer B, to create $150,000 total UM 
coverage limits. 
These higher amounts of available compensation result in higher payouts 
from an insurer, leading to increased costs to cover insureds compared to when 
stacking is unavailable.52 To offset the increased costs of coverage, insurance 
companies typically raise the premiums charged to consumers.53 Even with the 
increased cost, insureds benefit from increased coverage limits when they 
combine multiple policies, and they are able to receive sufficient coverage to 
compensate for damages sustained more easily.54 A cap on the compensation 
exists at the lesser of the total damages or the combined limits of coverage.55 
These caps both prevent insureds from receiving windfalls when injured by a 
negligent tortfeasor and permit insurers to reasonably predict the costs of 
coverage. 
 
 49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (9th ed. 2009). 
 50. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N. OF AM., ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL AUTO 
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST STACKING AND TRIGGER PROVISIONS 2 (2009), 
http://www.pciaa.net/web/sitehome.nsf/lcpublic/424/$file/um-uimstackingtriggers012309.pdf 
[hereinafter PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N]. 
 51. Id. at 1 (describing the distinction between inter-policy stacking, which involves the 
combining the limits coverage of vehicles insured under multiple policies, and intra-policy 
stacking, which involves combining the limits of coverage of vehicles insured under the same 
policy). Missouri courts have recognized both: 
“Stacking” refers to an insured’s ability to obtain multiple insurance coverage benefits for 
an injury either from more than one policy, as where the insured has two or more separate 
vehicles under separate policies, or from multiple coverages provided for within a single 
policy, as when an insured has one policy which covers more than one vehicle. 
Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313–14 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Tresner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 957 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1997)). 
 52. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. The states that permit stacking limit the recoverable compensation at the amount of 
total damages. The evidence illustrates that insurers pay higher claims on average in states that 
allow stacking than in those states that do not permit stacking. The higher payouts, combined 
with the compensation cap of the total damages, allow an inference that insureds required 
additional coverage to cover the damages associated with their accident. See id. at 2, 5. 
 55. See NOCE, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 44, at § 7:35. 
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A set-off provision is a method insurers use to deduct the tortfeasor’s 
liability limit from the amount payable to an insured, either under UM or UIM 
coverage.56 The method of computing a set-off dramatically affects the amount 
of compensation an injured insured recovers.57 One method of computing a 
set-off, known as damage limits set-off, is to subtract the amount recovered 
from a tortfeasor from the total amount of damages sustained by the insured.58 
In this method, if an insured purchased $50,000 of UIM coverage and sustains 
$100,000 of damages from a tortfeasor who held $25,000 of liability coverage, 
the insured can recover the full $50,000 UIM coverage limit. The set-off 
provision subtracts the $25,000 liability coverage from the total damages, 
creating $75,000 in remaining liability insured by the $50,000 UIM coverage. 
The other method used to compute a set-off, known as limits of coverage 
set-off, favors the insurer of the injured party by subtracting the tortfeasor’s 
liability policy limit from the limit of the injured party’s coverage.59 Using this 
method, if an insured purchased $50,000 of UIM coverage and sustains 
$100,000 in damages from a tortfeasor who held $25,000 of liability coverage, 
the insured recovers only $25,000 of the UIM coverage limit. The set-off 
provision subtracts the $25,000 liability coverage from the $50,000 limit of 
UIM coverage, creating a remainder of $25,000 in UIM coverage for the 
insured’s $75,000 in remaining damages. In the first example, the insured must 
absorb $25,000 in damages not protected by insurance, while in this second 
example the insured must absorb $50,000 in unprotected damages. 
A slightly different way to visualize set-off provisions is to view them in 
the context of what triggers, or activates, the UIM coverage.60 The first set-off 
method discussed above is akin to a damages trigger—the trigger occurs when 
the amount of damages exceed the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability 
coverage.61 After determining the trigger point, the liability policy limits are 
deducted from the total damages to establish the total amount payable to the 
insured, capped at the limits of UIM coverage.62 Under this trigger point, the 
 
 56. See Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 139–41 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc) (detailing the process of applying set-off provisions in both damage limits and policy limits 
situations). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. (deducting the tortfeasor’s insurer’s payment of $60,000 from the total damages 
of $1.8 million in determining that the full amount—$300,000—of the insured’s UIM coverage 
must be paid out, because $1.74 million exceeded that amount). 
 59. Id. at 139–40. The court in Ritchie declined to apply limits of coverage set-off, despite 
the insured’s attempts to argue its validity. Id. at 141. 
 60. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 3. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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amount recoverable by the insured equals the sum of the tortfeasor’s policy 
limits and the complete UIM coverage limits, capped at the total damages.63 
The second method used to calculate an insurer’s available set-off, as 
discussed above, is akin to a limits trigger. The trigger occurs when both the 
damages and the UIM coverage limits surpass the liability limits of the 
tortfeasor.64 When the circumstances trigger UIM coverage in this context, the 
amount paid from the UIM coverage is the difference between the tortfeasor’s 
liability policy and the UIM coverage limits.65 The liability limits of the 
tortfeasor are deducted from the UIM limits to determine the amount of 
coverage available to an insured. The cap on recovery under a limits trigger is 
the greater of the tortfeasor’s liability limits or the UIM coverage limits, not 
exceeding the amount of damages.66 
C. Missouri Courts’ Interpretation of Insurance Contracts and Provisions 
If an insurer and insured disagree on whether the insurance contract 
permits stacking, or if they disagree on the applicable set-off calculation 
method, Missouri courts will interpret the insurance policy according to 
Missouri contract law.67 Missouri courts invoke the four-corners approach to 
contract interpretation and thus enforce the provisions of a contract as 
written.68 Interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law reviewed de 
novo.69 When determining the coverage afforded within an insurance policy, 
the contract must be construed as a whole, rather than as detached provisions 
or clauses.70 Missouri law states that if an insurance contract is clear and 
unambiguous, the court does not have the power to rewrite the contract and 
must construe the contract as written.71 If only a single reasonable 
interpretation exists as to the extent of coverage offered within an insurance 
contract, the language of the contract will control, absent a statutory mandate 
or public policy consideration to the contrary.72 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Gabriel v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 897 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Mo. 1969)). 
 68. Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (citing J. E. Hathman, Inc. 
v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. 1973) (en banc)). 
 69. Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 70. Id. (quoting Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)). 
 71. Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(“Definitions, exclusions, conditions and endorsements are necessary provisions in insurance 
policies. If they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the policy as a whole, they are 
enforceable.”). 
 72. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 142. 
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However, if a court determines an ambiguity exists within an insurance 
contract, the court must determine the proper interpretation of that ambiguity.73 
This multi-step process begins with determining whether an ambiguity exists 
in the first place by examining the specific contract in dispute.74 According to 
Missouri caselaw, an “ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, 
or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy.”75 If a provision 
contradicts other aspects or clauses of the insurance policy, or if the provision 
can be reasonably interpreted with more than one meaning, Missouri courts 
declare the insurance contract to contain an ambiguity.76 When investigating an 
insurance contract for ambiguities, a court will view the contract using “the 
meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the layman who bought and 
paid for the policy.”77 When viewing the policy in this way, words are 
ambiguous if they are “reasonably open to different constructions.”78 
To determine the proper interpretation of an ambiguity that exists within an 
insurance contract, a court must view the ambiguity in terms of all reasonable 
interpretations.79 As a method of protecting the layman consumer, Missouri 
courts view any ambiguity in favor of an insured.80 Thus, after finding an 
ambiguity, a court will determine whether an ordinary person could reasonably 
expect coverage in that instance.81 If there are multiple reasonable 
interpretations of a provision located within an insurance contract, when 
viewed as a whole, the interpretation that favors the insured will control to 
determine the coverage dispute.82 
Although an ambiguity may exist, a court must not revise the contract and 
must still view the contract as written.83 If ambiguity exists but all reasonable 
interpretations of the provision still render coverage unattainable, a court must 
abide by the contract and find that no coverage exists.84 A court is not free to 
create coverage where none exists when viewing an ambiguity.85 
 
 73. Bickerton, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 898 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 74. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135. 
 75. Id. (quoting Seeck, 212 S.W.3d at 132). 
 76. Lutsky v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., of Mo., 695 S.W.2d 870, 875 n.7 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc). 
 77. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 78. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 79. Brugioni v. Md. Cas. Co., 382 S.W.2d 707, 710–11 (Mo. 1964). 
 80. Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) 
(citing Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)). 
 81. Brugioni, 382 S.W.2d at 710–11. 
 82. Id.; Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135. 
 83. Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) 
(“Courts may not unreasonably distort the language of a policy or exercise inventive powers for 
the purpose of creating an ambiguity when none exists.”). 
 84. Id. at 164–65. 
 85. See id. at 163. 
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Ambiguities do not attach solely to the meaning of a specific provision but 
also to the entire meaning of a contract.86 Where an insurance contract in 
Missouri promises certain coverage in one part, that coverage cannot be taken 
away by a different clause within the insurance policy without implicating a 
patent ambiguity.87 As a result, if a specific provision of the insurance contract 
promises coverage, but another provision seemingly excludes that coverage, 
the court must determine an ambiguity exists as a result of uncertainty in the 
policy and afford the previously promised coverage to the insured.88 
Along with this ambiguity rule, Missouri provides for two other 
circumstances where provisions of a contract may not be enforceable as 
written: if a contract provision is against a Missouri statute, or if the provision 
is against Missouri public policy.89 If the provision is against a Missouri statute 
or is against Missouri public policy, the insurance provision is rendered void 
while the remaining portion of the contract remains valid.90 While seemingly 
simple, this approach does have its own intricacies in determining when the 
public policy of Missouri creates a penumbral right to coverage and voids a 
contract provision. Generally, a court will look to the plain meaning of the 
language within a statute and will inquire into the intent of the enacting 
legislature when determining Missouri public policy.91 For example, and 
discussed more thoroughly later, Missouri courts, as a matter of public policy, 
found a penumbral right to stack UM coverages when the damages exceed a 
single UM policy limit.92 
II.  EVOLUTION OF THE MISSOURI STANDARDS FOR UM AND UIM POLICIES 
UM coverage in Missouri became mandatory with the enactment of section 
379.203 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.93 Following this enactment, the 
 
 86. Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) 
(“[C]ourts should not interpret policy provisions in isolation but rather evaluate policies as a 
whole.”). 
 87. Lutsky v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., of Mo., 695 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc) (“If a contract promises something at one point and takes it away at another, there is an 
ambiguity.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. 1991) 
(en banc) (holding that in the absence of ambiguity or state public policy, and implying by lack of 
statutory mandate that insurers carry underinsured motorist coverage, the policy stands 
unambiguous as written). 
 90. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) 
(rendering void provision within UM coverage as against Missouri public policy, as created by 
Missouri statute). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see infra Part II.A. 
 93. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203; Dawson v. Denney-Parker, 967 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
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Supreme Court of Missouri expanded the rights granted to insureds through the 
public policy enunciated by the 1967 statute.94 Although this granted insureds 
greater rights in the area of UM coverage, those same benefits did not carry 
into UIM coverage, according to the Missouri Supreme Court.95 As long as an 
insurer treated the types of coverages separately, so would the Missouri 
courts.96 Due to the lack of an enunciated public policy concerning UIM 
coverage, insureds typically faced strict judicial interpretation and enjoyed 
fewer rights.97 However, two 2009 Missouri Supreme Court decisions recently 
changed the landscape of UIM coverage98 and now demonstrate the need to 
legislatively regulate UIM coverage in Missouri. 
A. Enunciation of Missouri’s Public Policy Concerning UM Coverage and 
the Lack of a Similar Public Policy Regarding UIM Coverage 
The creation of a public policy consideration concerning UM coverage 
occurred following the enactment of section 379.203. Following the 
enactment, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the intent of the legislature 
and the overriding public policy considerations. However, due to the lack of a 
parallel statute regarding UIM coverage, the Missouri Supreme Court declined 
to extend the public policy considerations beyond UM coverage. 
1. Enunciation of Missouri’s Public Policy Concerning UM Coverage 
Decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1976, Cameron Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Madden permitted stacking of UM policies in all instances 
where the insured maintained UM coverage over several vehicles, even across 
policies purchased from different insurers.99 Through Cameron, the court 
established the existence of a penumbral right to stack UM coverages 
following the statutory mandate to include UM coverage within all insurance 
policies issued in Missouri.100 In Cameron, the insurer sought a declaratory 
 
 94. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544–45. 
 95. Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1991). 
 96. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“[T]he existence of UIM coverage and its ability to be stacked are determined by the 
terms of the contract entered into between the insurer and insured; and in the absence of any 
public policy mandating UIM coverage, if the policy language is unambiguous in disallowing 
stacking, the courts will not create such extra coverage.”). 
 97. See Trapf v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 886 S.W.2d 144, 147–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that insureds are not entitled to UIM coverage and that the lack of a provision granting 
UIM coverage does not alone render the policy language ambiguous). 
 98. Ward, supra note 4, at 1, 11; see also Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc); Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 99. 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). 
 100. Id. at 542. 
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judgment to determine whether an insurance policy, when insuring more than 
one vehicle, could limit the amounts of UM coverage to the state minimum—
then $10,000.101 The defendant insured argued that the state minimum 
coverage applied to each vehicle and that the public policy of Missouri against 
reducing the state minimum coverage of any vehicle permitted the stacking of 
the state minimum coverages.102 
Drawing heavily from the analysis in a comparable Florida Supreme Court 
case, Tucker v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,103 the Missouri 
Supreme Court determined that insurers are not free to limit the benefits paid 
for by the insured through policy clauses designed to prohibit stacking of each 
vehicle’s coverage.104 The court held that the insured maintained the ability to 
stack the policies of several vehicles for an accident involving a single vehicle, 
up to the limits of the damages sustained by the insured.105 Because the court 
relied on the public policy it presumed the legislature had intended, it did not 
concern itself with whether clauses listed within the policy unambiguously 
attempted to limit the ability of the insured to stack coverages.106 The court 
stated that “the public policy expressed in 379.203 prohibits the insurer from 
limiting an insured to only one of the uninsured motorist coverages provided 
by a policy,” and that all such coverages are available to an insured, “provided, 
of course, that insured is limited to recovery of damages suffered.”107 
Missouri public policy did not permit a prohibition on the insured’s 
recovery; therefore, the court did not determine whether the policy contained 
an ambiguity, as argued in the alternative by the insured.108 Whereas a finding 
resting on whether an ambiguity exists requires a case-by-case determination 
of whether the policy at hand properly limited the scope of recovery,109 the 
public policy pronouncement made by the court changed the analysis of 
stacking in the context of UM coverage. The analysis changed from one of 
contract interpretation to one of state policy—as a matter of law, Missouri 
permits the stacking of UM coverages when an insured maintains coverage for 
multiple vehicles and one of those vehicles sustains damage from an uninsured 
motorist.110 Following Cameron, Missouri courts continue to recognize the 
prohibition on insurers from enforcing clauses precluding stacking of 
 
 101. Id. at 538–39. 
 102. Id. at 539. 
 103. 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973) (construing a statute whose language tracked that of the 
Missouri statute at issue as entitling the insured to stack coverages). 
 104. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544–45. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 545. 
 107. Id. at 544–45. 
 108. Id. at 545. 
 109. See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text. 
 110. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 545 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] MODERNIZING UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN MISSOURI 1063 
coverages provided under multiple policies or where UM coverage for multiple 
vehicles exists under a single policy.111 
As a result of Cameron, insurance companies received predictable results 
stemming from the concrete judicial interpretation of UM insurance policies.112 
Insurers can better determine the costs of insuring individuals with multiple 
vehicles and do not have any doubt as to whether insureds will be able to use 
the coverage of all their policies in instances involving a single insured vehicle. 
From an insured’s standpoint, the ability to stack coverages results in higher 
limits of coverage for accidents involving a negligent uninsured motorist. 
These higher limits result in higher costs to insurers,113 but since compensation 
caps exist at the amount of damages sustained, the inference is that insurers 
more fairly and predictably disperse monetary awards to those raising 
claims.114 
2. Missouri’s Denial of Application of Public Policy Considerations to 
UIM Coverage 
The Missouri Supreme Court, when presented with the question of whether 
insurers could limit UIM coverages—specifically the stacking of coverages—
through provisions in a policy, answered the question in the affirmative. In 
Noll v. Shelter Insurance Cos. and Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance 
Co. of America, the Missouri Supreme Court outlined the requirements for 
reaching a public policy invalidation of an insurance contract provision.115 In 
both cases, insureds sought additional coverage from their insured in the form 
of stacking policies to increase compensation.116 In both instances, and similar 
to Cameron, the plaintiff sought more coverage than a single policy limit 
delivered.117 However, the court ended the comparisons between Cameron and 
the current cases with that similarity. 
In Noll, the court quickly distinguished Cameron on the basis that the type 
of coverage in dispute in Cameron, UM coverage, required inclusion within 
insurance policies through a statutory mandate.118 The court asserted that “[t]he 
 
 111. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544–45) (“Missouri public policy . . . requires 
that multiple uninsured motorist coverages must be allowed to be stacked, and prevents insurers 
from including policy language denying such stacking.”). 
 112. Ward, supra note 4, at 1. 
 113. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 2, 5. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Noll v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 774 S.W.2d 147, 151–52 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); Rodriguez v. 
Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. 1991). 
 116. Noll, 774 S.W.2d at 148; Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383. 
 117. Noll, 774 S.W.2d at 148; Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383; Cameron Mut. Ins. v. Madden, 
533 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). 
 118. Noll, 774 S.W.2d at 151. 
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coverage here involved was not mandated by statute at the time liability arose, 
and so the parties were free to contract as to limits of coverage.”119 Holding 
valid and enforceable “policy provisions prohibiting the aggregation of 
coverage under multiple policies,” the Noll court denied the plaintiff insured 
further relief.120 The decision in Noll, although not explicitly involving UIM 
coverage, allows insurers greater ability to constrict policies and to include any 
exclusion desired by the insurer, so long as no ambiguity exists. 
In the subsequent Rodriguez decision, the Missouri Supreme Court applied 
the decision in Noll directly to UIM coverage, while also expanding the 
reasoning under Noll and limiting the availability of the courts to declare 
provisions as against Missouri public policy.121 Rodriguez, unlike Noll, 
involved a challenge on an anti-stacking clause located within a UIM policy.122 
When outlining the judicial interpretation of UIM contracts, the court applied 
the rationale used in the Noll opinion directly to UIM policies.123 Specifically, 
the court stated that no public policy consideration existed to declare an anti-
stacking clause located within a UIM policy void.124 
The Rodriguez court also more clearly outlined when public policy 
considerations exist while simultaneously removing from Missouri courts the 
ability to declare a public policy consideration absent statutory guidance.125 
Rather, the court left the ability to declare public policy in the hands of the 
legislature.126 The court held that without a statutory requirement in Missouri 
for UIM coverage, no public policy consideration exists.127 The court then 
declared that, similar to Noll, the language of the insurance contract containing 
the UIM coverage controls whether stacking may occur without any influence 
from the public policy considerations of similar coverages contained in the 
same contract, such as UM coverage.128 
On account of the Missouri Supreme Court decisions in Noll and 
Rodriguez, insurers have the ability to insert language into a UIM policy 
specifically prohibiting the ability of the insured to stack coverages.129 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 151–52. 
 121. Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. 1991). 
 122. Id. at 383. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 383–84. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383. 
 127. Compare id. at 383–84 (declaring no public policy in the absence of statutory authority), 
with Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) 
(determining that a penumbral right to stack UM coverages shall exist as a matter of public policy 
following the statutory mandate of UM coverage). 
 128. Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383–84. 
 129. Id.; Noll v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 774 S.W.2d 147, 151–52 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
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Although the court stated that insurers and insureds are free to contract the 
ability to stack coverages, insurers routinely insert anti-stacking clauses into 
UIM policies without a bargain.130 Although in theory an insured maintains the 
ability to contract for a UIM policy containing the ability to stack, insurers 
throughout Missouri insert the anti-stacking clauses into policies as a matter of 
course.131 Although an insured may pay premiums toward multiple UIM 
coverages, insurers routinely prohibit an insured to collect on the UIM 
coverages purchased at the times when an insured most needs them. 
B. Historical Reluctance to Declare Ambiguities Within UIM Coverage 
Provisions 
Following the precedent set in Noll and Rodriguez, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Eastern District, later exemplified the extent of the judiciary’s 
disinclination to determine UIM coverage provisions ambiguous, upholding 
policy exclusions not valid in the context of UM coverage. The Eastern District 
in Trapf v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. declared that the impossibility of 
recovery in any situation did not create an ambiguity, regardless of whether the 
insurer collected premiums for coverage.132 In Trapf, the insured sought 
compensation from a $25,000 UIM policy.133 At the time of the collision 
causing the need for coverage, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 
of Missouri required a minimum of $25,000 liability coverage.134 The 
insurance contract in Trapf declared that the definition of an underinsured 
motor vehicle did not include vehicles where the tortfeasor’s liability limits 
were less than the liability limits required under Missouri law; that is, the 
contract considered any individual who maintained liability coverage at less 
than the state-required level to be an uninsured motorist for purposes of 
insurance coverage.135 Therefore, by definition, an underinsured motor vehicle 
could not be a vehicle where the tortfeasor maintained less than $25,000 of 
liability coverage. 
To mitigate the amount of insurance payable to the insured, the insurer 
inserted a provision excluding UIM coverage when the liability policy limits of 
a tortfeasor equaled or surpassed the UIM coverage limits.136 This exclusion 
prevented the insured in this case from ever collecting on the $25,000 UIM 
 
 130. KEVIN P. SCHNURBUSCH, RYNEARSON, SUESS, SCHNURBUSCH & CHAMPION L.L.C., 
STACKING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COVERAGE: CLE PROGRAM PRESENTED FOR THE 
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (May 23, 2003). 
 131. Id. 
 132. 886 S.W.2d 144, 147–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 303.190. 
 133. Trapf, 886 S.W.2d at 146. 
 134. Id. at 147. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 146. 
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coverage in any circumstance.137 Due to the ability of the insurer to exclude 
payments under any circumstance, the UIM coverage maintained no value.138 
In a nutshell, no recovery under the UIM coverage occurred if the policy limits 
of the tortfeasor were less than the $25,000 required under section 303.190, nor 
did recovery occur when tortfeasor liability limits equaled or surpassed 
$25,000 since the policy excluded recovery when the tortfeasor maintained 
insurance greater than or equal to the UIM coverage limits, here $25,000—
under no circumstance would the insured recover under the UIM coverage.139 
Even as the court recognized the lack of value in the UIM policy in this 
instance, it also foreclosed the possibility of recourse.140 Because of the 
principles enunciated by Noll and Rodriguez, the court did not broach the topic 
of whether the impossibility of UIM coverage in any circumstance violated 
Missouri public policy; rather, the court only analyzed whether the provisions 
eliminating UIM coverage in all possible circumstances created an ambiguity 
in the policy.141 Although the trial court determined an ambiguity existed 
because of the promise of UIM coverage in the contract and the subsequent 
preclusion of coverage for this policy, the appellate court in Trapf followed the 
language of Rodriguez and reversed the trial court’s holding, stating, “The fact 
that there is no actual underinsured motorist coverage in the Trapf policy does 
not make it ambiguous.”142 Trapf illustrates both historical aspects of UIM 
contract interpretation in Missouri: the lack of public policy considerations 
when examining UIM coverage, and the general unwillingness to declare UIM 
provisions ambiguous. 
Following the 1994 Trapf decision, the Missouri legislature, to prohibit the 
sale of UIM coverage that maintained no value, enacted the first statute in the 
state to address an issue concerning UIM coverage in 1999.143 Section 379.204 
of the Missouri Revised Statutes removed the ability of insurers to charge 
 
 137. Id. at 147. 
 138. See Trapf, 886 S.W.2d at 147. 
 139. The court reprinted the UIM provision in question. The relevant portion of the policy 
follows with the original emphasis included: 
“Underinsured motor vehicle” means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to 
which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but its 
limit for bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this coverage. However, 
“underinsured motor vehicle” does not include any vehicle or equipment: 
1. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident 
but its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit for bodily injury 
liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which your 
covered auto is principally garaged. 
Id. at 146. 
 140. Id. at 147–48. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 146–47. 
 143. See MO. REV. STAT. § 379.204. 
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premiums for UIM in situations where, in actuality, no UIM coverage exists.144 
Section 379.204 effectively set the minimum amount of UIM coverage capable 
of being marketed and sold at $50,000.145 If an insurer provides a UIM policy 
at a limit less than double the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
minimum, currently $25,000, the UIM policy shall be construed to provide 
excess insurance.146 This designation as excess insurance eliminates an 
insurer’s ability to reduce the UIM policy limits by any amount recovered from 
the tortfeasor’s liability—excess insurance provides coverage on top of 
existing recoverable policies.147 Therefore, if an insurer sells $25,000 of UIM 
coverage, that amount cannot be reduced by a set-off provision and is 
recoverable by the insured upon a showing of sufficient damages. To date, this 
is the only statute in Missouri concerning UIM coverage. 
C. Increased Complexity Within Insurance Contracts 
Although Trapf indicates the reluctance of Missouri courts to declare UIM 
coverage ambiguous, Missouri courts have found ambiguities in certain 
contexts. Most notably, the Missouri Supreme Court found an ambiguity exists 
when insurers treat UM and UIM coverage indistinguishably within a 
policy.148 In Krombach v. Mayflower Insurance Co., Ltd., the court analyzed 
the insured’s UIM coverage to determine whether the policy unambiguously 
prohibited stacking.149 There, the court determined that the insurer lumped the 
UM and UIM coverages together in a single provision.150 The court stated that 
when an “insurance carrier lumps apples and oranges together and calls the 
entire class ‘apples,’” the court shall treat them as such.151 
The Krombach court declared that in instances where the insurer treats UM 
and UIM coverages identically, the public policy applying to UM coverage 
 
 144. Id. (“Any underinsured motor vehicle coverage with limits of liability less than two 
times the limits for bodily injury or death pursuant to section 303.020 shall be construed to 
provide coverage in excess of the liability coverage of any underinsured motor vehicle involved 
in the accident.”). 
 145. Although an insurer, in theory, may be able to sell UIM at less than $25,000, thereby 
reducing the coverage total recovery to the insured at a $25,000 minimum of tortfeasor liability 
plus the additional UIM coverage of less than $25,000, no case exists in Missouri where the UIM 
limits of liability did not at least equal the minimum liability insurance required under state law. 
 146. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.204. 
 147. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 816 (9th ed. 2009) (“excess insurance. An agreement to 
indemnify against any loss that exceeds the amount of coverage under another policy. — Also 
termed excess policy.”). 
 148. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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shall apply to UIM coverage.152 Thus, the court permitted the insureds to stack 
UIM coverages as if they were controlled by the public policy considerations 
of UM coverage.153 Following this decision, insurers separated the UM and 
UIM provisions within a contract to assure the public policy considerations 
affecting UM coverage do not give those same rights to insureds making UIM 
coverage claims.154 
Krombach also found an ambiguity within the UIM coverage concerning 
the set-off provision.155 The set-off provision contained within the contract 
stated that “[a]ny amounts payable . . . shall be reduced by all sums” collected 
from the tortfeasor.156 When presented with the decision of whether to set-off 
the recoverable liability insurance of the tortfeasor from the total damages or 
from the limits of the UIM coverage, the court determined that an ambiguity 
existed within the contract.157 According to the court, the term “any amounts 
payable” could reasonably mean either the limits of the UIM coverage or the 
extent of damages.158 Because of the ambiguity, the court concluded that the 
interpretation favoring the insured controlled and held that the amount of 
recovery from the tortfeasor’s liability policy were to be set-off from the total 
damages rather than the limits of the UIM policy.159 
 
 152. Id. (“The same public policy that invalidates anti-stacking provisions of uninsured 
motorist coverage is equally applicable to underinsured motorist coverage if the two are treated as 
the same in the insurance contract.”) 
 153. Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 212. 
 154. SCHNURBUSCH, supra note 130 (“Most of the time you can’t stack [u]nderinsured 
coverage . . . unless the insurance policy is worded poorly.”). 
 155. Krombach, 827 S.W. 2d at 211. 
 156. Id. The court reprinted the critical portions of the UIM coverage concerning set-off of 
recovery from the tortfeasor: 
PART 6: UNINSURED (AND UNDERINSURED) MOTORIST 
. . . . 
B. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
We will pay damages which a Covered Person is legally entitled to recover from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
(a) sustained by 
1. covered person; and 
(b) caused by an accident. 
. . . . 
D. MAXIMUM PAYMENTS UNDER YOUR UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE. 
The most we will pay for all claims from a single accident is the Limit of Coverage shown 
on the Coverage Data Page. 
. . . . 
Any amounts payable under Part 6 shall be reduced by all sums: 
(a) paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of someone who may be liable. 
Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Krombach, 827 S.W. 2d at 211. 
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Beginning in 1999, Missouri courts began viewing other portions of the 
insurance contract to determine whether an ambiguity existed in the sense of 
creating coverage in one provision and later revoking such coverage.160 In 
Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co. of Missouri, the 
court first looked at the language of the anti-stacking clause to determine 
whether any ambiguity existed in this portion of the UIM coverage.161 The 
court agreed that the language of the anti-stacking clause replicated the 
language of the clause located in Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Co. 
of America, a clause found not to be ambiguous by the Missouri Supreme 
Court.162 However, the court analyzed the contract further.163 
The Plaintiff in Niswonger argued that another provision of the UIM 
coverage created the ability to stack limits by labeling the UIM coverage 
purchased as an excess policy.164 The court viewed the disputed language 
located in a portion of the coverage termed an “Other Insurance” provision and 
determined that the last sentence of the provision did create an ambiguity.165 In 
that last sentence, the insurer stated that “any insurance provided under this 
endorsement for a person insured while occupying a non-owned vehicle is 
excess of any other similar insurance.”166 According to the court, although the 
anti-stacking clause perhaps did not contain an ambiguity, the last sentence of 
the “Other Insurance” provision created an ambiguity by conflicting with the 
anti-stacking clause as to whether the UIM coverage acted as excess insurance 
and could be stacked with other UIM coverages.167 In Niswonger, the court 
looked outside just the anti-stacking clause to determine an ambiguity 
requiring stacking of policies existed. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, ultimately limited the 
scope of Niswonger’s impact by declaring that the result in Niswonger 
occurred because the plaintiff sustained injury while occupying a non-owned 
vehicle.168 However, the Eastern District later made a subtle shift in Chamness 
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., by declaring that the policy did not 
 
 160. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 315–16 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 161. Id. at 314. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 314–15. 
 164. Id. at 315. 
 165. Niswonger, 992 S.W.2d at 315. Interestingly, the sentence the court determined created 
an ambiguity was not only the last sentence of the provision, but also the last sentence of the UIM 
coverage. Id. 
 166. Id. at 315–16. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 315; see also Clark v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 92 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“The Niswonger decision specified that the ambiguity only arose in the factual 
situation where the accident occurred while the insured was ‘occupying a non-owned vehicle.’”). 
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unambiguously define “a vehicle you do not own” as a vehicle not owned by 
either of two policy-holders.169 Therefore, the court ruled to allow stacking of 
UIM coverage to compensate for the damages sustained by the wife while 
operating her husband’s vehicle.170 
Following each Missouri court decision, insurers have tended to change the 
language within insurance contracts to avoid the ambiguities announced by the 
court.171 Since each court decision can only inquire into the language within 
the contract presented, any one decision by the Missouri courts finding a policy 
ambiguous only reaches so far as those insurance contracts containing the same 
language.172 Because of the constant evolution of insurance contracts, the 
decisions of the Missouri courts dwindle rapidly in their importance. Although 
the courts have attempted to funnel contract language into more obvious 
terms,173 the effect on insurance contracts is exactly the opposite. UIM 
coverage provisions in Missouri are becoming more burdensome, require 
greater analysis by courts and laypersons, and insurers are constantly rewriting 
existing policies to create the exact wording that courts will construe as 
unambiguous as a matter of law.174 This process creates increasingly complex 
caselaw and increasingly complex insurance contracts.175 This waltz between 
 
 169. 226 S.W.3d 199, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 170. Id. at 203, 208. 
 171. See Ward, supra note 4, at 11 (advising insurers to review recent Missouri cases that 
found ambiguities to help rewrite current policies in order to avoid mistakenly providing 
coverage not required under the law). 
 172. Bough & Heath, supra note 38, at 210 (“Previous court decisions determining UIM 
coverage are not controlling unless the insurance policy language is identical.”). 
 173. See Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) 
(suggesting language for an insurer to insert into UIM coverages to replace language deemed 
ambiguous by the court). 
 174. Compare Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 824 S.W.2d 19, 20, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991) (determining that set-off applies to the total damages when underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage is defined as one that provides “limits less than the damages an insured person is legally 
entitled to recover”), with Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) (determining that set-off applies to the UIM coverage limits when underinsured motor 
vehicle is defined as “one with liability insurance with a ‘. . . limit . . . less than the limit of 
liability for this coverage’”) (quoting Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 
379, 381 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)). See also Bough & Heath, supra note 38, at 208 (“While the 
general principals behind uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages seem straightforward 
enough, any lawyer who has dealt with the issues surrounding uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage issues are anything but simple. In fact, Judge Daniel Scott of the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Southern District recently stated, ‘As things now stand, even legally 
sophisticated persons may find it practically impossible to know their UIM coverage . . . which 
cannot be a desirable situation.’”). 
 175. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 598–99 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (Scott, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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the judiciary, insurers, and insureds continued through the current phase of 
decisions rendering UIM provisions ambiguous and invalid.176 
D. The Current State of the Missouri Supreme Court’s Analysis of UIM 
Coverage 
The Missouri Supreme Court decided two decisions in 2009 that altered 
how a Missouri court views an ambiguity. In Jones v. Mid-Century Insurance 
Co. and Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co., the court 
determined that the policies contained ambiguities arising from a conflict 
between two separate provisions.177 In Jones, the insureds sought 
compensation from an accident causing more than $150,000 in damages to 
each of them.178 After each received $50,000 from the tortfeasor’s liability, the 
insureds then sought further compensation from the UIM coverage in the 
amount of $100,000 per person.179 The insurer cited the set-off provision 
within the policy—which contained language previously ruled unambiguous 
by courts when standing alone—and contended that the UIM coverage only 
provided an additional $50,000 of coverage per person.180 However, the court 
viewed the set-off provision in the context of the entire contract and 
determined the set-off provision conflicted with the “Limits of Liability” 
provision located within the UIM coverage.181 
 
 176. See infra Part II.D. 
 177. Jones, 287 S.W.3d at 692; Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 140–
41 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 178. Jones, 287 S.W.3d at 689. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 689, 692. The court included the relevant portions of the UIM coverage, which 
included the limit of liability provision and the set-off provision. 
Limit of Liability 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed the limits of 
UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage stated in the policy, and the most we will pay will be 
the lesser of: 
1. The difference between the amount of an insured person’s damages for bodily 
injury, and the amount paid to that insured person by or for any person or organization 
who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury; or 
2. The limits of liability of this coverage 
b. Subject to subsections a. and c.—h. in this Limits of Liability section, we will pay up to 
the limits of liability shown in the schedule below as shown in the Declarations. 
  Coverage Designation Limits 
   (each person / each occurrence) 
  U9100/300 
f. The amount of UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage we will pay shall be reduced by any 
amount paid or payable to or for an insured person; 
i. by or for any person or organization who is or may held legally liable for the bodily 
injury to an insured person; or 
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According to the court, the provision created an ambiguity when it stated 
“the most [the coverage would] pay” an insured was the lesser of either the 
difference between the limits of the tortfeasor’s liability policy and the 
payments already made, or “[t]he limits of liability of this [UIM] coverage.”182 
The court stated an ambiguity arose because a reasonable interpretation of the 
UIM coverage was that the insurer would pay $100,000 under some 
circumstances.183 However, if the set-off provision applied to the liability 
limits, the insurer would never pay the coverage limits of $100,000.184 The 
court ruled that the resulting ambiguity required the set-off provision to apply 
towards the damages sustained rather than the liability limits—in a sense, 
defining the UIM coverage as a damage trigger when an ambiguity arises.185 
In Ritchie v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co., another 2009 
Missouri Supreme Court decision, the court again signified a more general 
willingness to declare UIM coverages ambiguous as compared to the existing 
precedent.186 The court again ruled the coverage ambiguous concerning 
whether to use a damage or limit set-off, and it also determined the coverage 
ambiguous concerning the ability to stack coverages.187 The insureds in this 
case sustained damages greater than $1.8 million, a total greater than the 
combined policy limits of the tortfeasor’s liability policy and the three UIM 
coverages purchased, and asserted both the ability to apply the set-off to the 
damages sustained and the ability to stack the UIM coverages.188 
The court first determined that an ambiguity arising in the coverage created 
the ability to stack the three UIM coverages.189 This case, like Niswonger, 
turned on the fact that the insured sustained damages while in a vehicle she did 
not own.190 The court, taking into consideration the entire contract, looked to 
the terms of the “Other Insurance” provision, which stated, “[a]ny coverage we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other 
collectible underinsured motorist coverage.”191 The court held that, when read 
 
ii. for bodily injury under the liability coverage of this policy . . . . 
Id. at 690. 
 182. Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 690–91 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 691. 
 185. Id. at 693. 
 186. 307 S.W.3d 132, 138 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 187. Id. at 138, 140–41. 
 188. Id. at 134. 
 189. Id. at 138. 
 190. Id. at 138. 
 191. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 137 (emphasis omitted). The court reprinted the pertinent portion 
of the UIM coverage, adding emphasis to the portions deemed particularly relevant: 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for Underinsured 
Motorists coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for case, loss of 
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together, although the anti-stacking clause may normally be applicable, a 
reasonable interpretation exists that the anti-stacking clause does not apply in 
cases where the insured sustains damage while in a vehicle not owned by that 
insured.192 After determining an ambiguity existed that allowed stacking of the 
UIM coverages, the court next turned to the issue of whether to set-off the 
tortfeasor’s policy against the total damages or against the limits of the UIM 
coverage.193 
In a decision similar to Jones, the court determined an ambiguity existed 
due to language in the “Limits of Liability” provision of the contract stating, 
“this is the most we will pay.”194 The court indicated that one potential means 
of salvaging the contract would be to insert additional language in order to 
remove the ambiguity created by the “Limits of Liability” provision, and it 
cited Jones for an example of what language the insurer might add in order to 
make clear the set-off provision applies as against the liability limits of the 
 
services, or death arising out of “bodily injury” sustained by any one person in any one 
accident. Subject to this limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Schedule 
or in the Declarations for each accident for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages for “bodily injury” resulting from any one 
accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the numbers of: 
1. “Insureds;” 
2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
B. The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums: . . . [p]aid because of ‘bodily injury’ 
or by or on behalf of persons organizations who may be legally responsible . . . 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable underinsured motorists coverage available under one or more 
policies or provisions of coverage: 
1. Any recovery for damages may equal but not exceed the highest applicable limit for any 
one vehicle under this insurance or other insurance providing coverage on either a 
primary or excess basis. In addition, if any such coverage is provided on the same basis, 
either primary or excess, as the coverage we provided under this endorsement, we will 
pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total 
of all applicable limits for coverage provided on the same basis. 
2. Any coverage we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over 
any other collectible underinsured motorist coverage. 
Id. at 136–37. 
 192. Id. at 137–38 (“When subsection (2) is read together with the provisions in which Allied 
relies, the three subsections suggest ‘that the policy’s anti-stacking provisions, which might 
normally and otherwise apply, do not apply in the special situation where the insured is injured 
while occupying a non-owned vehicle.’” (quoting Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country 
Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999))). 
 193. Ritchie, 307 S.W.2d at 139. 
 194. Id. at 140–41. 
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tortfeasor.195 The court declared a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguity to 
be application of the set-off provision against the total damages sustained, 
thereby allowing for compensation of the policy limits for each of the three 
UIM coverages.196 
Jones and Ritchie had the potential to encourage litigation concerning 
whether existing UIM coverages contained ambiguities within the anti-
stacking clauses and set-off provisions.197 Such spike in litigation will wane 
until the Missouri courts again find it necessary to find ambiguities in language 
that is abundant throughout Missouri UIM coverages.198 Furthermore, this type 
of judicial reconstruction of what constitutes ambiguities, while benefiting a 
few insureds involved directly in the litigation, harms consumers by creating 
more difficult and complex policies designed to comport to the standard of the 
law as opposed to the comprehension ability of the reasonable consumer.199 As 
 
 195. Id. The Jones court determined that rather than stating “[t]he limits of liability of this 
coverage” is the most an insurer will pay under UIM coverage, the “Limits of Liability,” to be 
clear, should state that “[t]he limits of liability of this coverage minus the amount already paid to 
that insured person” is the most an insurer will pay, or else the insurer risks creating an 
ambiguity. Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 196. Ritchie, 307 S.W.2d at 141. In a footnote to the case, the court asserted that policy limit 
set-off provisions are permissible in Missouri if no ambiguity exists. Id. at 141 n.10. 
 197. See Ward, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that Jones and Ritchie indicate that Missouri 
courts are likely to find ambiguities in many existing UIM policies); Bough & Heath, supra note 
38, at 208 (explaining that the clarification by Missouri courts, combined with the predicted rise 
in uninsured motorist coverage rates resulting from the economic downturn, “will inevitably drive 
up the number of uninsured motorist claims . . . .”). 
 198. See supra notes 173–86 and accompanying text. 
 199. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 598–99 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (Scott, 
C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Scott succinctly stated his concerns over the increasing complexity 
of the insurance policies due to judicial intervention and subsequent revision of insurance policies 
in Missouri. Below is the full dissent of Chief Judge Scott. 
  I respectfully dissent. Notwithstanding the court’s painstaking analysis, I cannot 
square its result with our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jones and Ritchie, which I 
consider to be controlling on the issues in this case. 
  I also offer these observations, for whatever they may be worth, with no intent to 
criticize anyone and with full appreciation for sanctity of contract and stare decisis. It 
approaches a fiction, in my view, to think that the complicated analyses in this and other 
recent UIM cases yield “the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary [insurance 
purchaser] of average understanding.” I do not fault this court for making and laying out 
charts to distinguish its policy interpretation under Lynch from the trial court’s 
interpretation based on Ritchie and Jones. Indeed, it may be almost necessary to do so 
given the increasing complexity of relevant opinions and the nuances upon which they 
turn. Yet a divergence may be developing between our espoused consumer-based standard 
of interpretation and the sophisticated policy comparisons and legal analyses that we 
actually (and per recent caselaw, perhaps necessarily) undertake. 
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it stands now, UM coverage receives stable interpretation of the benefits 
available to an insured due to a legislative enactment, whereas UIM coverage 
remains subject to the whims associated with judicial cycles. The Missouri 
legislature should follow the majority lead of the states and create a legislative 
remedy in order to provide insureds the same benefits under UIM coverage as 
they receive under UM coverage. 
III.  STATUTORY SCHEMES REGULATING UIM COVERAGE NATIONWIDE 
Statutes regulating UIM coverage exist throughout the United States. In 
fact, most states regulate UIM coverage issues via statutory schemes, as 
opposed to the predominantly judicial regulation present in Missouri—
Missouri falls into the minority of states that rely on judicial constructs to 
effectively regulate UIM coverage within the state.200 However, the regulatory 
schemes outside Missouri vary considerably when determining the ability of an 
insured to insert anti-stacking clauses and to enforce policy limits set-off 
provisions. 
 
  As things now stand, even legally sophisticated persons may find it practically 
impossible to know their UIM coverage for such scenarios, which cannot be a desirable 
situation. 
Id. 
 200. While section 379.204 of the Revised Missouri Statutes does address UIM coverage, it 
only requires that UIM be treated as excess where the UIM limits are less than twice the state 
minimum liability limits, thus avoiding the situation discussed in Trapf. See MO. REV. STAT. § 
379.204; see also supra Part II.D. Currently, forty-six jurisdictions regulate UIM coverage via 
statutory schemes rather than judicial mandates, exemplifying the divergence of the minority to 
which Missouri belongs. Such statutes include ALA CODE § 32-7-23 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 
28.20.445 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (2003); ARK CODE ANN. § 23-89-209 
(1997); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-609 (2011); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18, § 3902 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 627.727 
(2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301 (1998); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 41-2502 (2009); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5. /143a. (2004); IND. CODE. § 27-7-5-
2 (2012); IOWA CODE § 516A.1 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 304.39-320 (1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.175, § 
113L (1991); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A § 2902 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 19-509 (2007); 
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-
6413 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.145 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15 (2010); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §17:28-1.1 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-5-301 (1983); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420 
(McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §1-40-15.3 (2003); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (2013); OKLA. STAT. § 3636 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.504 
(2012); 75 PA. STAT. ANN. §1731 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
38-77-160 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-9.4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1202 
(1999); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31a-22-305.3 (2012); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 941 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 
48.22.030 (2009); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1998); WIS. STAT. § 632.32 (2012). 
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A common trend featured in most states’ regulatory schemes is reciprocal 
benefits between UM and UIM coverage.201 Reciprocal benefits are those that 
allow for similar, if not identical, coverage under UM and UIM coverage, and 
provide greater certainty for UIM coverage to both insurers and insureds—to 
insurers by comporting to a standard already adopted by UM statutes and 
public policy, and to insureds by ensuring sufficient and similar recovery 
independent of the tortfeasor’s insurance status.202 Providing semi-reciprocal 
schemes furthers the interests of both insurers and insureds while solving the 
insurance paradox of greater recovery when a tortfeasor does not maintain state 
required liability insurance.203 The distinct language of each state’s laws 
providing reciprocal benefits does demonstrate, however, that care must be 
taken when observing the trends nationwide and crafting statutory schemes to 
ensure a balance between insurers’ and insureds’ rights. 
A. Reciprocal Treatment of UM and UIM Coverages 
An overwhelming majority of states contain legislative provisions 
requiring the offering of UIM coverage to insureds, with only four states 
abstaining from legislative regulation—Michigan, Missouri, Montana, and 
Wyoming.204 This figure accounts for the states that include UIM under the 
definition of UM. For example, New Hampshire requires both UM and UIM 
coverage, although the statute only explicitly states UM.205 Additionally, of the 
forty-five jurisdictions that maintain UIM statutes, it is possible that at least 
twelve mandate the inclusion of UIM coverage within insurance policies.206 
The permissibility of mandating UIM coverage within various other states 
indicates that it is possible to also require insurers in Missouri to carry UIM 
coverage. 
 
 201. See infra Part III.A. 
 202. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 200. 
 205. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15 (2012); Wyatt v. Md. Cas. Co., 738 A.2d 949, 953 
(N.H. 1999) (“The statute [§ 264:15] . . . requires that where an insured chooses to purchase 
liability coverage greater than the statutory minimum, underinsured motorist coverage shall be 
equal to that amount.”). 
 206. Whether UIM coverage is mandated and the option of waiver exclusion is open to some 
statutory interpretation; however, the following statutes contain language that arguably requires 
UIM coverage: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336) (2010), Kansas, KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-284 (1988), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A § 2902 (2006), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. 
§ 65B.49 (2008), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15 (2010)); North Carolina 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (2010)); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §1-40-15.3 (2003), 
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 742.504 (2012), Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (1993), 
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-9.4 (1997), Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 941 
(2005), and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (2011). 
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The more interesting aspect of UM and UIM coverage nationwide is the 
level of reciprocity between the two coverages. In fact, as indicated previously, 
many states do not differentiate between UM and UIM coverage, but rather 
treat the coverage rights interchangeably (hence, “reciprocal” coverage).207 
However, states that statutorily mandate UIM coverage are not the only states 
that provide reciprocal benefits between the two coverages. For example, 
Montana is a state that statutorily requires the offering of UM coverage within 
all insurance policies, but does not provide a similar statutory requirement for 
UIM coverage.208 Even so, Montana maintains the same public policy 
considerations for both types of coverage, indicating the compulsion of UIM 
coverage where that policy would be served.209 Missouri is in the severe 
minority of states that afford drastically different rights. 
B. Stacking of Policies 
When discussing the right to stack coverages, an important aspect to 
consider is the distribution of the state laws and policies concerning whether to 
prohibit stacking, whether to allow anti-stacking clauses, and whether to allow 
stacking as a matter of right in certain circumstances. If a wide variance 
occurs, this likely illustrates that the ability to stack does not create prohibitive 
insurance costs on the part of the insurer, nor does the ability to stack create 
unaffordable rates for consumers. Although stacking coverages leads to higher 
payouts by insurers, and subsequently higher rates for insureds, the benefits are 
substantial enough to afford stacking as a right in many states.210 
In total, at least eleven states prohibit stacking policies under almost all 
circumstances.211 Of the thirty-nine states that do allow stacking under some 
circumstances, at least sixteen states permit the insurer to exclude stacking 
 
 207. See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text. 
 208. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-23-201 (2011). The language of the statute requires insurers to 
provide protection against only “uninsured motor vehicles” and makes no mention of 
underinsured motor vehicles. 
 209. Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703, 710 (Mont. 2003) (“Montana public policy 
considerations that favor adequate compensation for accident victims apply to underinsured 
motorist coverage.”). 
 210. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 211. Those eleven states are California, CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2012), Connecticut, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336 (2013), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(d) (2012), Maryland, 
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-513(b) (West 2012), Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 
113L (2013), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3(a)(6) (2013), Nebraska, NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 44-6410 (2012), New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1(c) (2013), North Dakota, N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 26.1-40-15.4 (West 2011), South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-9.8 
(2012), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201 (West 2012). 
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with clear and unambiguous language, the same standard set forth under 
Missouri’s UIM regulatory scheme.212 
Although Missouri allows stacking for UM policies as a matter of right, the 
inability to do so in such a large majority of states for UIM coverage likely 
indicates that an absolute right to stack coverages is ill-favored by insurers 
(due to increased payouts), insureds (due to increased coverage rates), or both. 
When determining whether to allow stacking under Missouri UIM coverage, 
the legislature should take this into consideration, along with the substantial 
number of states that do allow stacking with limitations. 
C. Set-off Provisions 
Across the nation, only two main types of set-off provisions exist—
damage limit and policy limit set-offs.213 The trend nationwide is not 
unanimous, but the majority of states offer policy limit set-offs versus damage 
limit set-offs—twenty-nine states provide policy limit set-offs.214 Likely, states 
consider the limits of UIM coverage to be the amount that an insured requires 
in order to maintain sufficient coverage. Additionally, policy limit set-offs 
provide greater equality between UM and UIM coverages and help to remove 
the insurance paradox between accidents involving uninsured tortfeasors and 
those involving tortfeasors with inadequate coverage. 
To understand this concept, envision Driver A, who maintains $100,000 
UM coverage and $100,000 UIM coverage. If driver A sustains $150,000 of 
total damages from an uninsured tortfeasor, the UM policy reimburses him 
 
 212. Those sixteen states are Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(H) (West 2013), 
Arkansas, Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 9 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Ark. App. 2000), Colorado, State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stein, 924 P.2d 1154, 1158 (Colo. App. 1996) aff’d, 940 P.2d 384 
(Colo. 1997), Idaho, Hill v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 812, 827 (Idaho 2011), reh’g 
denied (Apr. 29, 2011), Illinois, Maka v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 772 N.E.2d 895, 902 (Ill. App. 1st 
Dist. 2002), Iowa, Swainston v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 774 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Iowa 2009), 
Michigan, Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Mich. 2003), Missouri, DeMeo 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 09-0472-CV-W-ODS, 2011 WL 2746089 at *2 (W.D. Mo. 
July 13, 2011) aff’d, 686 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2012), Nevada, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Knauss, 775 P.2d 707, 708 (Nev. 1989), New Mexico, Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 
1255, 1260 (N.M. 2004), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18F (West 2012), Oregon, Heffner 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 162 P.3d 277, 280 (Or. App. 2007), Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1738 (West 2012), Vermont, Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 914, 
919 (Vt. 1987), West Virgina, Mitchell v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 514 S.E.2d 393, 396 (W. Va. 
1998), and Wisconsin, Gragg v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 637 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Wis. App. 2001). 
 213. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 214. PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 6. California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin provide policy limit set-offs. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] MODERNIZING UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN MISSOURI 1079 
only the $100,000. If Driver A sustains the same damages with a minimally 
insured tortfeasor, he will receive $100,000 total compensation under policy 
limit set-offs, but will receive $100,000 in addition to the extent of the 
tortfeasor’s liability limits, up to the total amount of damages sustained. Under 
damage limit set-offs, the insurance paradox pendulum unfairly swings to 
benefit those involved in accidents with tortfeasors maintaining insufficient 
protection versus those involved in accidents with uninsured tortfeasors. 
With a goal of solving the insurance paradox in Missouri, one can gain 
great perspective by viewing the system of reciprocal rights developed by a 
majority of the states. An overwhelming majority of states offer reciprocal 
benefits between UM and UIM coverage and many states require a mandate to 
include UIM coverage within all insurance policies.215 Further, a great variety 
exists between the states concerning the ability to stack coverages, likely 
illustrating that a workable model exists that includes stacking rights within 
UIM coverages.216 However, that the majority of states allow for policy limit 
set-offs demonstrates the preferred method among insurers and lawmakers to 
equalize coverage between UM and UIM coverages.217 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR UIM COVERAGE TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS 
OF INSURERS AND INSUREDS IN MISSOURI 
While these varying state models display a constructive template 
applicable to the legislative solution needed in Missouri, the state cannot 
simply mirror the pattern followed by the majority of states in the nation for 
UIM coverage because of its deeply entrenched public policy considerations 
for UM coverage and the need to provide semi-reciprocal coverage between 
UM and UIM coverages.218 As in the overwhelming majority of states, where 
the language of the statute offers similar benefits in both UIM and UM 
coverages, Missouri must attempt to provide similar benefits for UIM coverage 
as those Missouri public policy deems necessary in UM coverage. Moreover, 
to make the legislation palatable to the interests of insurers and consumers 
alike, a compromise must be reached between the guaranteed stacking of 
policy limits available under UM coverage and the current state of permitting 
absolute exclusion of stacking separate UIM coverages. 
This Comment proposes a legislative remedy that contains two portions—
the first favoring insurers and the second favoring consumers—to promote a 
 
 215. See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 217. Supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text; PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS’N, supra note 
50, at 6. 
 218. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) 
(stating that public policy prohibits the insurer from limiting an insured to only one of the UM 
coverages provided by a policy). 
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lasting balance between the competing interests. To create this balance, the 
first portion of the legislative remedy views UM and UIM in the same context, 
which is to cover insureds as if no other funds for protecting the innocent, 
injured party exist. This first portion of the legislative compromise entails two 
important aspects: the necessary creation of a mandate to include UIM 
protection in Missouri insurance policies and the ability for insurers to set-off 
recovery of the UIM coverage limits by the recoverable liability limits of the 
tortfeasor. The second portion of the legislative remedy attaches UIM coverage 
to the insured versus attaching the coverage to a particular vehicle. By 
attaching coverage to the individual, the insured achieves the ability to stack 
UIM coverages, but with some legislative limitations. 
The aspects contained in the first portion of the legislative compromise 
favor insurers in Missouri since UIM coverage is already included voluntarily 
in many insurance policies. The big benefit to insurers exists in the state 
directive to permit a set-off of the recovery from the tortfeasor’s liability 
policy. The idea here is to first assume that UM and UIM coverage exist as the 
sole available insurance recovery for a non-liable, injured insured. In the 
context of UM coverage, this is an intrinsic characteristic of the coverage since 
no tortfeasor insurance exists to provide support to the injured party. Applying 
this sentiment to UIM coverage, we first assume that the UIM coverage is the 
sole source of equitable financial recovery available to the injured party—a 
legal fiction. This legal fiction constructs the basis of a public policy rationale 
for creating a state mandate to include UIM coverage within insurance policies 
issued in Missouri and allows the state to determine that the primary UIM 
coverage’s limit creates an equitable recovery. 
Applying this public policy sentiment to the feature that separates UM and 
UIM coverage—an actual available recovery from the tortfeasor—the 
legislature shall allow a set-off in the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability policy 
limit. Since an equitable recovery under a primary policy containing UIM 
coverage would be that coverage’s policy limit, we may now assume that 
subtracting actual recovery from the tortfeasor’s liability coverage does not 
undermine the rationale of the Missouri legislature.219 Including the set-off 
provision within the legislative remedy promotes predictability by determining, 
in essence, that the UIM coverage limit is the amount the insured shall receive 
under the primary policy from the combined resources of the tortfeasor’s 
liability limit and the UIM coverage. 
 
 219. Because UIM coverage remains a separate cost within an insurance policy, section 
379.204 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which promotes UIM coverage at least double the state 
minimum liability requirement, shall remain in effect to disallow set-off of benefits if the UIM 
coverage is less than double the state minimum under section 303.190. MO. REV. STAT. § 
379.204. 
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The second portion of this legislative compromise proposes that UIM 
coverage follows the insured that purchased the coverage rather than remaining 
attached to a specific vehicle.220 As much as the initial portion of the two-part 
compromise favors insurers, this second portion likely equally favors insureds. 
As mentioned previously, an aim of any Missouri legislative remedy 
concerning UIM coverage must be semi-reciprocal benefits as those of UM 
coverage, which provides sufficient recovery for insureds. Akin to UM 
coverage, this determination shall not limit recovery to a single policy, but 
rather shall treat UIM coverage as following the insured rather than the 
vehicle; as such, stacking of UIM coverages shall be permitted. However, the 
preference towards recovery of the policy limits when damages require shall be 
applicable to the UIM coverage contained within the primary policy—the 
insurance policy of the vehicle involved—with the subsequent additional UIM 
coverages acting as excess coverage. 
In order to truly create a compromise between the insurer and insured, this 
second portion must differ slightly from that of the UM public policy 
pronouncement of Missouri courts. In order to create a legislative proposal 
with the ability to attract the interests of both businesses and consumers, the 
stacking provision cannot be absolute, even though that is the case with UM 
coverage. UIM stacking shall limit the additional recovery under the excess 
UIM coverages maintained by the insured to the state minimum required 
insurance levels under section 303.190 of the Revised Statutes of the State of 
Missouri, which is currently $25,000.221 This difference, although minor, will 
ensure that the resulting giveaway of the insurance industry does not surpass 
that of the giveaway from consumers in the first portion of the legislative 
compromise. Curtailing the ability to stack UIM coverages increases insurer 
payout predictability. Furthermore, in order to achieve a balanced rule 
concerning stacking, the legislature may articulate that any additional UIM 
coverage purchased by an insured shall be limited to the Missouri minimum 
insurance requirements. Additionally, allowing the stacking of UIM coverages 
purchased by the insured creates an additional avenue of recovery for an 
injured party whose initial UIM coverage did not sufficiently offset the 
damages accrued. 
Therefore, the legislative proposal contains two portions to strike a balance 
between the predictability required by insurers and the protections insisted by 
insureds. First, it assumes that both UM and UIM coverage provide the sole 
economic recovery for an injured insured. Although in the case of UIM 
 
 220. This idea is not foreign to Missouri courts. Browning v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 341 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & 
Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)). However, neither the 
Missouri Supreme Court nor the state legislature advanced this concept. 
 221. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.190. 
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coverage this is actually a legal fiction, it provides the public policy rationale 
to mandate UIM coverage while also creating the rationale for allowing a set-
off of the UIM coverage in the amount recovered from the tortfeasor’s liability 
policy. Second, it declares that UIM coverage attaches to the insured rather 
than any particular vehicle. This portion of the proposal requires the policies to 
permit stacking of UIM coverages purchased by the insured. However, to 
create a more predictable payout for insurers, this stacking of additional UIM 
coverages shall limit the recovery under additional, excess UIM coverages to 
the state minimum insurance requirements prescribed by section 303.190. 
Thus, the two-part compromise entails three aspects to foster predictability for 
insurers and sufficient recovery for insureds: mandating inclusion of UIM 
coverages within Missouri insurance policies; allowing reduction of the UIM 
coverage limits in the amount of recovery from a tortfeasor’s liability limits; 
and permitting stacking of UIM coverages in an amount equal to the state 
minimum insurance requirement under section 303.190 for each excess policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The ability to stack automobile coverages allows insureds injured in a car 
accident to turn to insurance to help ease the financial burden associated with 
the total damages inflicted by the accident. As a matter of public policy, 
Missouri allows insureds to stack UM coverages from multiple policies when a 
tortfeasor maintains no insurance.222 This policy is well enunciated and known 
throughout the insurance community.223 Missouri’s fully enunciated public 
policy of allowing stacking of UM policies produces predictability of 
insurance payouts as opposed to the unpredictable landscape concerning the 
ability to stack UIM coverages. Certainty provided to an insurer concerning the 
limits of payouts, along with the increase in financial support available should 
a catastrophic automobile accident handicap an insured, creates a sustainable 
balance between turning a profit as a business and providing a service 
genuinely needed by the public.224 
Unfortunately, this same balance does not exist in the context of UIM 
coverage, which acts to the detriment of both insurers and insureds. An 
imbalance arises in UIM coverage due to the lack of a Missouri statute 
delineating public policy, such as the one in the context of UM coverage. 
Leaving to the judiciary the decisions of whether to permit stacking and 
whether to use policy limit or damage limit set-offs on a case-by-case 
determination provides security to neither business nor consumer interests.225 
Although recent decisions favor the consumer, the current unrest stemming 
 
 222. Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 544–45. 
 223. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 224. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 171–76 and accompanying text. 
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from recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions exemplifies the unpredictability 
of judicial contractual interpretation and provides evidence of the need for 
legislative intervention. 
A legislative enactment concerning UIM coverage must occur in order to 
truly void Missouri of the insurance paradox discussed in this Comment. This 
legislative remedy needs only two main prongs in order to succeed in creating 
an atmosphere agreeable to both the insurance industry and consumers alike. 
First, the legislation needs to assert that both UM and UIM coverage provide 
insurance compensation when no other adequate remedy exists. This would 
declare that the minimum coverage limits proffered by the state are sufficient 
protections to the masses. This declaration mandates UIM coverage within 
insurance policies while also allowing insurers to use policy limit set-offs, 
which is the more insurer friendly method of the two set-off provisions. 
The second assertion needed by a legislative enactment is a 
pronouncement that Missouri insureds shall maintain the ability to stack 
multiple UIM coverages purchased up to the total damages sustained in an 
accident. The ability to stack, an insured-favored ability, is not without 
constraint in order to increase predictability for insurers. Under the proposed 
legislative remedy, an insured can recover the limits of the primary policy and 
stack each additional coverage in the amount of the state required minimum of 
UIM coverage. 
This legislative proposal offers compromises to both insurance companies 
and insureds to better promote predictable coverage and compensation. In 
order to create a legislative remedy that can actually have force of law, both 
sides of this issue must come to an agreement tailored to the unique aspects 
associated with UIM coverage. The benefits of this proposal include a 
statutorily mandated inclusion of UIM coverage within all Missouri policies 
that provides semi-reciprocal coverage between UM and UIM policies, while 
also creating greater predictability in overall payouts of UIM claims prior to an 
accident occurring. The paradox associated with UM coverage needs to end in 
Missouri. This proposal does so with the interests of insurers and insureds in 
mind in order to offer a legislative remedy with the possibility of approval 
from various interest groups and, ultimately, enactment into law. 
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